CONSTITUTIONAL

JAW-FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT-EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE PROHIBITS LITIGANTS FROM EXERCISING
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE BASIS OF GENDER-J.E.B. v. Ala-

bama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
The Supreme Court has historically exalted the peremptory
challenge1 as an important element in achieving a fair and impartial jury trial in both criminal and civil cases.' During voir dire,3
1 "Peremptory" is defined as "arbitrary; not requiring any cause to be shown."
BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the
peremptory challenge is "[t]he right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being
required to assign, a reason for the challenge." Id. The peremptory challenge has
also been defined as a "challenge without cause, without explanation and without
judicial scrutiny...." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965). While the challenge for cause is based upon specified and provable reasons, the peremptory is "an
arbitrary and capricious species of challenge." Id. at 212 n.9 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353), 220 (citation omitted). That is, it is based upon "'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare
looks and gestures of another.... .'" Id. at 220 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1892)).
As the Swain Court elaborated, the availability of peremptory challenges allows
litigants to determine possible bias through questions during voir dire. Id. at 219.
The Court explained that the availability of peremptories "facilitates the exercise of
challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror's hostility through examination and challenge for cause." Id. at 219-20.
2 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted) ("By allowing the litigant to strike jurors for even
the most subtle of discerned biases, the peremptory challenge fosters both the perception and reality of an impartial jury."); Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted)
(noting that the use of the peremptory challenge guarantees a system characterized
"'not only [by] freedom from any bias against the accused, but also [by freedom]
from any prejudice against his prosecution'"). For a more detailed discussion of the
importance of the peremptory challenge, see WILLiAM FORSVTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY
JURY 145 (1875) ("The right of challenge is almost essential for the purpose of securing perfect fairness and impartiality in a trial."); Barbara L. Horwitz, The Extinction of
the Peremptory Challenge: What Will the Jury System Lose by Its Demise?, 61 U. CIN. L. REv.
1391, 1439 (1993) (explaining that "the peremptory is as important today as ever in
achieving what it was designed to accomplish").
Blackstone has also proclaimed the importance of the peremptory challenge:
while the peremptory is an "'arbitrary and capricious species of challenge ... the law
wills not [that a defendant] ...be tried by any one against whom he has conceived a
prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason for such dislike.'" Gerald A.
Bunting & Lesley A. Reardon, Note, Once More Into the Breach: The Peremptory Challenge
After Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 329, 330
n.6 (1991) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353).
Some commentators, however, have criticized the peremptory challenge. See,
e.g., Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REv. 517, 564 (1992) (stating that "the peremptory challenge poses
a substantial danger of contributing to minority underrepresentation on jury
panels"); Carl H. Imlay, FederalJury Reformation: Saving a DemocraticInstitution, 6 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 247, 269 (1973) (footnote omitted) ("Whether the peremptory chal-
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the system gives litigants the opportunity to strike potential jurors

in two ways: for cause' or peremptorily. 5 Litigants employ the
challenge for cause to eliminate jurors who possess actual, as opposed to perceived, bias. 6 The peremptory challenge, created by
statute,7 allows litigants to remove or strike potential jurors whom
lenge, retained in both civil and criminal cases[, .. . remains a necessary practice
today is questionable."). As one author elaborated, whenever a litigant wishes to eliminate a particular minority group from the venire, that litigant will have a better
chance of success than will the litigant who wishes to strike members of the majority
race. Bray, supra, at 564. That is, "'[d]espite the fact that both parties have peremptories, the party relying on views more often expressed by minority group members will in practice be less able than her adversary to control the composition of the
jury.'" Id. (quoting Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to
Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REv. 781, 800 (1986)). Additionally, Bray criticized the challenge by noting that if codified, the statute would be unconstitutional
because it "'would lack a rational basis.'" Id. at 565 (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The
Supreme Court and theJury: VoirDire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts,
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 204 (1989)).
3 "Voir dire" is a "phrase [that] denotes the preliminary examination which the
court and attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine their qualification and
suitability to serve as jurors." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990). Both
peremptory challenges and challenges for cause may be exercised during this examination. Id.
4 The challenge for cause is based upon "narrowly specified, provable and legally
cognizable bas [es] of partiality...." Swain, 380 U.S. at 220; see also Photostat Corp. v.
Ball, 338 F.2d 783, 785-86 (10th Cir. 1964) (distinguishing the peremptory challenge
from the challenge for cause). The Photostatcourt noted that under the common law,
the challenge for cause was used to strike those jurors who had a relationship with
one of the litigants. Id. at 785 (citation omitted). If such a relationship existed, the
court explained, the judge could presume bias on the part of the juror. Id. (citations
omitted). The court explained that combined with the peremptory challenge, the
challenge for cause becomes the judge's measure for actual bias, whereas counsel may
use the peremptory challenge to address any perceived bias. Id. at 786.
5 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. In most jurisdictions, each litigant is entitled to a
specified number of peremptory challenges. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1136 (6th ed.
1990); see also infra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the peremptory challenge under the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE). It is only after
each side has exhausted its peremptory challenges that litigants must "furnish a reason for subsequent challenges," or challenges for cause. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1136 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
6 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
7 In criminal cases, the use of the peremptory challenge is governed by Rule 24 of
the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, which provides in part:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20
peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10
peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine or both, each side is
entitled to 3 peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). In civil cases, however, the United States Code provides that
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the parties perceive as biased.'
Despite repeated endorsements of the peremptory challenge
by both the Supreme Court and legal commentators,9 the Court
has taken steps in recent years to severely handicap the free exercise of the challenge.1 ° Relying on equal protection principles,1"
"each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or
several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the purpose of making challenges, or the court may allow additional peremptory challenges .

. . ."

28 U.S.C.

§ 1870 (1988).
8 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (citing Thiel v. Southern Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (.1946) ("Competence to serve as ajuror ultimately depends
on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial."); Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (explaining that the purpose of
the peremptory challenge is "not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise").
The Swain Court also noted that the peremptory challenge is frequently used on
grounds such as race, religion, and nationality-grounds not normally thought of as
relevant to legal proceedings. Id. at 220 (footnote omitted). Additionally, the Court
explained that these factors are often touched upon in voir dire, and that "the fairness of trial by jury requires no less." Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
9 See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits of the
peremptory challenge.
10 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 405, 413 (1991). The Court has repeatedly
addressed the issue of racism in the jury system. See id. at 404-05; see also Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of
race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (determining
that the Fourteenth Amendment restricts private litigants in civil cases from striking
potential jurors on the basis of race); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause prevents the prosecutor from challenging jurors solely on the basis
of race); Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (concluding that the Batson rule applies regardless of
whether the struck juror and criminal defendant share the same race); Swain, 380
U.S. at 224 (stating that the prosecutor's intentional and systematic removal of blacks
from the jury may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
11 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o
State shall . .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Historically, the Equal Protection Clause has
been interpreted to prohibit only race-based discrimination. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that a state statute confining jury service to
white males violates equal protection). The Strauder Court explained that the then
recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment was designed "to protect an emancipated
race, and to strike down all possible legal discriminations against those who belong to
it." Id.
Justice Strong, writing for the StrauderCourt, proffered that the Amendment can
only be properly understood if viewed in light of "the history of the times ... [in
which it was] adopted, and the general objects [it] plainly sought to accomplish." Id.
at 306 (citation omitted). The Court explained that because discrimination against
blacks was easily foreseeable, the Equal Protection Clause was enacted for "protection
against unfriendly action in the States where they were resident." Id.
The StrauderCourt, relying heavily on the purpose and intention of the drafters
of the Fourteenth Amendment, also declared that the Equal Protection Clause should
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the Court has repeatedly and unequivocally held that the intentional exclusion of jurors on the basis of race violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2 Most
recently, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., xs the Supreme Court extended the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of race-based exclusions to those based on gender. 14 InfJE.B., the Court held that
intentional gender-based discrimination in the exercise of the perof the Fouremptory challenge is an unconstitutional violation
15
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
The State of Alabama filed a child support and paternity suit
against J.E.B., the father of a minor child. 6 The State, suing on
behalf of the child's mother, used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to remove men from the jury."' J.E.B., the petitioner, obnot be interpreted as applicable to classifications based on gender, landownership, or
age. Id. at 310. The Court "'doubt[ed] very much whether any action of a State, not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes, as a class, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision.'" Id. at 307 (quotation omitted).
Over the next century, however, the Court did in fact hold that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from discriminating on
the basis of classifications other than race. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (holding that a city violates equal protection when
it requires a special use permit before leasing a building to mentally retarded persons); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1984) (footnotes omitted) (holding
that equal protection prohibits a state from denying aliens the right to become notary
publics); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (footnote
omitted) (stating that equal protection prohibits a state-sponsored university from
denying men admission solely on the basis of gender); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 355 (1963) (holding that equal protection prevents a state from denying indigent defendants the right to counsel on appeal).
12 See, e.g., McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
does not allow race-based peremptory challenges by criminal defendants); Edmonson,
500 U.S. at 628 (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits race-based
peremptory challenges by private civil litigants); Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (concluding
that the Batson rule applies regardless of whether the defendant and the juror are
members of the same racial group); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (holding that a prosecutor
may not intentionally and systematically exclude blacks from the jury); Swain, 380
U.S. at 224 (explaining that a prosecutor's intentional and systematic removal of
blacks from the jury may constitute a violation of equal protection).
1 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994).
14 Id. at 1422.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1421. Jury selection began in October, 1991. Id. Of the panel of 36 potential jurors, comprised of 12 men and 24 women, the Court removed three jurors
for cause. Id. Consequently, only 10 men remained on the panel of potential jurors.
Id. at 1421-22.
17 Id. at 1421, 1422. J.E.B. also exercised all but one of his peremptory strikes to
exclude female jurors. Id. at 1422. Alabama uses what is known as the "struckjury"
system, where litigants alternately strike jurors until 12 people remain to comprise the
jury. Id. at 1429 n.17 (citation omitted). Alabama argued that this method of jury
selection precluded litigants, at least in some cases, from being able to provide race or
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jected to the State's use of its peremptory challenges, claiming that
the strikes were used against male jurors wholly on account of gender, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution."
The petitioner relied on Batson v. Kentucky, 19 which
prohibited race-based peremptory challenges, to argue that inten20
tional gender-based discrimination was likewise prohibited.
The trial court, after rejectingJ.E.B.'s equal protection claim,
empaneled an all-female jury.2 1 The jury found J.E.B. to be the
child's father, and the court ordered the payment of child support. 2 2 Subsequently, the court denied the petitioner's post-judgment motion and reaffirmed its decision that the Batson rule does
not apply to gender-based peremptory challenges. 23 The Court of
Civil Appeals of Alabama, relying on Alabama precedent, affirmed
the ruling of the trial court.2 4 Subsequently, the Supreme Court of
gender-neutral explanations for their strikes. Id. For example, the State claimed that
a litigant may find it necessary to strike jurors from the venire randomly after there is
no articulable reason for doing so, thus making a race or gender-neutral explanation
impossible. Id. The Court, however, noted that Alabama had "managed to maintain
its struck-jury system even after the ruling in Batson, despite the fact that there are
counties in Alabama that are predominately African-American." Id. Most likely, the
Court reasoned, the voir dire process helps litigants establish race-neutral reasons for
their strikes. Id. Therefore, the Court determined that a state's jury selection methods "cannot insulate it from the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause. Alabama is
free to adopt whatever jury-selection procedures it chooses so long as they do not
violate the Constitution." Id.
18 Id. at 1422 (citation omitted). Specifically, the petitioner argued that the logic
and reasoning of prohibiting peremptory strikes based on race should likewise prohibit intentional discrimination based on gender. Id.
19 476 U.S. 79 (1986). For a more in-depth analysis of Batson, see infra notes 66-74
and accompanying text.
20 JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
21 Id. (citation omitted).
22 Id. Blood tests and other evidence offered at trial proved with 99.92% accuracy
thatJ.E.B. was in fact the child's father. Id. at 1437 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). The father,
however, contended that the blood test results should not have been allowed into
evidence because the State did not prove a "proper chain of custody." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1419
(1994). Specifically, J.E.B. claimed that the phlebotomist's failure to take the stand
rendered the test results inadmissible. Id. The appellate court, however, held that
the supervisor of the DNA laboratory established a proper chain of custody, and affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id. (citation omitted).
23 Brief for Petitioner at 4-5,J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)
(No. 92-1239). In the post-judgment motion,J.E.B. requested an order for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, for a new trial. Id. at 4. The petitioner
argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
State from exercising the peremptory challenge solely on the basis of gender. Id.
Additionally, J.E.B. challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the State to "articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for challenging the jurors, in accordance with ...
Batson v. Kentucky." Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
24 J.E.B., 606 So. 2d at 157 (citations omitted). Specifically, the court relied upon
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Alabama denied certiorari.2 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 6 to decide whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of peremptory challenges based on gender. 7 Relying on a long history
of cases confronting the issues of race and gender discrimination
in jury selection and the use of the peremptory challenge, 8 the
a series of decisions of the court of criminal appeals, all of which refused to extend
Batson to gender-based strikes. Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court held
that peremptory challenges on the basis of gender do not violate equal protection.
Id. (citing Murphy v. State, 596 So. 2d 42, 43 (citations omitted) ("The law currently
states that Batson does not extend to gender-based strikes."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86
(Ala. 1992); Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027, 1031 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding
that the appellant "failed to provide any indication that he was prejudiced by the
State's exercise of peremptory strikes against females on the venire"), cert. denied, 587
So. 2d 1039 (Ala. 1991); Daniels v. State, 581 So. 2d 536, 539 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(holding that "Batson offers no authority for the extension of the principles contained
therein beyond racial discrimination"), cert. denied, 581 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 1991); Dysart
v. State, 581 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (explaining that "[w]hile the
strictures of the Equal Protection Clause undoubtedly apply to prohibit discrimination due to gender in other contexts, there is no evidence to suggest that the
Supreme Court would apply normal equal protection principles to the unique situation involving peremptory challenges"), cert. denied, 581 So. 2d 545, 546 (Ala. 1991).
25 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422 (citingJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., No. 1911717 (Ala.
Oct. 23, 1992)).
26 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
27 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422. As the United States Supreme Court noted inJ.E.B.,
there is a decided split of authority in the federal courts of appeals as to whether
Batson should apply to gender-based peremptory strikes. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422 n.1
(comparing United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990), affd on
reh'g, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (extending Batson to genderbased strikes) with United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that Batson does not prohibit peremptory challenges on the basis of gender);
United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to extend
Batson to gender), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989, 990 (1992); United States v. Hamilton,
850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the extension of Batson to genderbased strikes), cert. dismissed sub nom. Washington v. United States, 489 U.S. 1094
(1989), and cert. denied sub nom. Hamilton v. United States, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990)).
Similarly, the state courts have also split on the issue of whether the Constitution
prohibits gender-based peremptory strikes. Id. (comparing Laidler v. State, 627 So. 2d
1263, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing an extension of Batson to gender);
State v. Burch, 830 P.2d 357, 365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (same) with Murphy v. State,
596 So. 2d 42, 43 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (refusing to extend Batson to gender), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 86, 87 (1992); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Neb. 1989)
(same); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (same)) (other citations omitted).
28 Throughout its comprehensive study ofjury selection and the peremptory challenge, the Court examined several of its previous decisions dealing with discrimination in the jury selection process. Id. at 1421, 1424; see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (citation and footnote omitted) (reaffirming that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from discriminating on the basis of race in the use of
peremptory challenges); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (explaining that a state cannot deny women the right to serve on juries); Strauder v. West
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Court held that intentional gender-based discrimination violates
equal protection. 9
The Supreme Court has considered issues of discrimination in
jury selection procedures on many occasions.3" In Strauder v. West
Virginia,31 the first case to confront racial discrimination in the
courtroom,3 2 the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a state stat-

ute limiting eligibility for jury service to white males. 3 The Court
held that a state denies its citizens equal protection under the laws
when it allows for a jury selected through racially discriminating
means.3 4 Justice Strong, however, emphasized that the Court's

Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (determining that a state statute limiting potential
jurors to white males is unconstitutional).
29 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422. Justice Blackmun applied the heightened scrutiny test
of Reed v. Reed to determine that gender is an unconstitutional measure for determining juror competence and impartiality. Id. at 1424 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76 (1971) (citation omitted)). Specifically, the Court asked whether "'an exceedingly
persuasive justification"' for the gender-based exclusions existed. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at
1425 (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). Justice Blackmun ultimately concluded that peremptory strikes based on gender do not substantially further any important governmental interest, and thus lack the justification
necessary to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 1426-27 (citation and footnotes
omitted).
30 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 82, 89-90 (questioning whether the State's use of the
peremptory challenge on the basis of race constitutes a denial of equal protection);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965) (considering whether the peremptory
challenge may be used to exclude blacks from juries); Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305 (questioning whether an entire race may be excluded from jury service).
31 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See generally Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway , 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725 (1992);
Genevieve A. Harley, Comment, Restricting the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1113 (1989).
32 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478-79 (1990) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879)) ("It has long been established that racial groups cannot be excluded from the venire .... That constitutional principle was first set forth.., under
the Equal Protection Clause [in] Strauder v. West Virginia .... "
33 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. Before his trial commenced, Strauder, a black man,
objected to a West Virginia statute that disqualified all black men from jury service.
Id. at 304. The statute read: "'All white male persons who are twenty-one years of age
and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors. .. .'" Id. at 305
(quotation omitted). Strauder petitioned for removal to the circuit court in order to
litigate the issue. Id. at 304. The trial court denied the petition, and ajury comprised
solely of white men subsequently voted to convict Strauder of murder. Id.
34 Id. at 310. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that:
[the] question[ ] is not whether a colored man, when an indictment has
been preferred against him, has a right to a grand or petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color, but it is
whether, in the composition or selection ofjurors by whom he is to be
indicted or tried, all persons of his race or color may be excluded by
law, solely because of their race or color, so that by no possibility can
any colored man sit upon the jury.
Id. at 305.
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holding should not be interpreted to apply to any group, other
than blacks, who might be excluded from jury service. 5
It was not until 1946, in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 36 that the
Court revisited the issue of discrimination in jury selection. In
Thiel, the plaintiff filed a civil suit in state court alleging negligence
against a railroad company.3 " During the course of jury selection,
all persons who worked for a daily wage were intentionally excluded from the jury panel.3 9 The Court held that the trial court
should have granted the motion to strike the panel of jurors.4 °
Later that year, in Ballard v. United States,4 1 the Court consid-

ered whether the intentional exclusion of women from a panel of
potential jurors renders a defendant's conviction invalid.4 2 The
Supreme Court did not decide the issue on equal protection
grounds, but rather, relying on its holding in Thie, determined
that the intentional and systematic exclusion of women from the
panel of jurors violated congressional intent.43 The Court ex35 Id. at 310. The Court explained that the State may dictate the qualifications of
jurors, such as limiting those eligible for jury duty to landowners, certain age groups,
or men. Id. Justice Story proclaimed:
We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to
prohibit this. Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose.
Its aim was against discrimination because of race or color .... "It is so
clearly a provision for that race [blacks] and that emergency [slavery],
that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other."
Id. (quotation omitted).
36 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
37 See id. at 219-20.
38 Id. at 218.
39 Id. at 219.
40 Id. at 225. Justice Murphy, writing for the Court, began the analysis by noting
that the idea of an impartial jury selected from a fair cross-section of society "does not
mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic,
social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would be impossible." Id. at 220 (citations
omitted). The Justice explained, however, that jurors must be selected by non-discriminatory means. Id. The Court elaborated that:
[r]ecognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an
individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very
heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class
distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic
ideals of trial by jury.
Id.
41 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
42 Id. at 189-90. In Ballard, the government conceded "that women were not included in the panel of grand and petit jurors in the Southern District of California
where the indictment was returned and the trial had; [and] that they were intentionally and systematically excluded from the panel." Id. (footnote omitted).
43 Id. at 193 (citation omitted). The Court noted that women have been permitted
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plained that Congress has instructed the federal courts to follow
the rules of the highest court of the state in which they sit in deciding who is eligible for jury service.44
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, rejected the argument that an all-male jury, because it is drawn from various groups
within society, is as representative as a jury containing women. 5
The Justice explained that the numerous differences between the
sexes warrant inclusion of both men and women on the jury.4 6
Thus the Court, concluding that the exclusion of either sex would
constitute an unrepresentative jury, dismissed the defendant's indictment.4 7 The Court justified its holding by explaining that the
exclusion of women from the panel of jurors could prejudice both
the defendant and the entire system that Congress contemplated. 8
Despite the Court's holding in Ballard,women remained a minority on juries for many years.4 9 It was not until 1975, in Taylor v.
to serve on juries in the Southern District of California since 1944. Id. at 190 n.1
(citation omitted).
44 Id. at 190 (citation omitted). Specifically, the Court explained that by congressional statute, "jurors in a federal court shall have the same qualifications as those of
the highest court of law in the State." Id. (citation omitted). Under this congressionally created system, federal courts sitting in states where women are eligible for jury
service should empanel juries representative of both sexes. Id. at 191.
45 Id. at 193-94. The Court refuted the theory that "the factors which tend to influence the action of women are the same as those which influence the action of menpersonality, background, economic status-and not sex." Id. at 193 (footnote
omitted).
46 Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas declared: "The truth is that
the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different
from a community comprised of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the
other is among the imponderables." Id. (footnote omitted). Recognizing this fact,
the Court proclaimed that the exclusion of either sex "may not in a given case make
an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded."
Id. at 194.
47 Id. at 195, 196.
48 Id. at 195. Specifically, the Justice asserted that "[t]he injury is not limited to
the defendant-there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the
community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts." Id.
49 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961) (citations omitted) (explaining
that the disproportionate amount of women on a jury does not make the jury selection process constitutionally invalid); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947) (citations and footnote omitted) (holding that "blue-ribbon" or "special" juries are not
unconstitutional merely because a class of persons is underrepresented in a particular
jury).
In Fay, the Court considered the constitutionality of a "blue-ribbon" or "special"
jury used in the State of New York. Fay, 332 U.S. at 264. The Court explained that a
blue-ribbon jury resulted when the State granted exemptions from service to women
who chose not to serve, despite the fact that women were qualified to serve asjurors in
New York at the time. Id. at 267 (footnotes omitted).
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Louisiana,5" that the Court relied upon the Constitution to squarely
JusticeJackson, writing for the Court, concluded that "woman jury service has not
so become a part of the textual or customary law of the land that one convicted of
crime must be set free by this Court if his state has lagged behind what we personally
may regard as the most desirable practice. . .

."

Id. at 290. The Fay Court observed

that "because of the long history of unhappy relations between the two races, Congress has put these cases in a class by themselves." Id. at 282. In analyzing the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Justice noted in Rawlins, the Court held that the
intentional exclusion of occupational groups such as lawyers, dentists and engineers
from jury selection lists was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 283 (citing Rawlins v.
Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906)). The Justice explained, however, that:
We do not mean that no case of discrimination in jury drawing except
those involving race or color can carry such unjust consequences as to
amount to a denial of equal protection .... But we do say that since

Congress has considered the specific application of this Amendment to
the state jury systems and has found only these discriminations [against
blacks] to deserve general legislative condemnation, one who would
have the judiciary intervene on grounds not covered by statute must
comply with the exacting requirements of proving clearly that in his
own case the procedure has gone so far afield that its results are a denial
of equal protection ....
Id. at 283-84 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Court held that in order to prove a
violation of equal protection, the petitioner must prove a clear showing of discrimination; demonstrating the underrepresentation of a class, such as women, was not
enough. Id. at 284 (citations and footnote omitted).
Similarly, in Hoyt, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Florida statute
that provided that no woman would be called for jury service unless she volunteered
for it. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 58 (quotation omitted). Hoyt argued that because very few
women volunteered for jury duty, the practical application of the statute meant that
most juries consisted entirely of men. Id. at 64.
The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that the statute was unconstitutional on
its face, and concluded that a state may constitutionally relieve women from jury service. Id. at 62. The Court explained that Florida was not attempting to exclude women from service, but rather, gave women the privilege of serving without imposing
service as an obligation. Id. at 60 (quoting Fay, 332 U.S. at 277). Justice Harlan reasoned that the case "in no way resembles those involving race or color in which the
circumstances shown were found by this Court to compel a conclusion of purposeful
discriminatory exclusions from jury service." Id. at 68 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Court stated that "the disproportion of women to men on the list independently carries no constitutional significance. In the administration of the jury laws
proportional class representation is not a constitutionally required factor." Id. at 69
(citing Fay, 332 U.S. at 290-91) (other citations omitted).
Hoyt, however, was overruled by the Court in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
537 (1975). See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Taylor.
The Taylor Court stated that:
[it was] no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequence is that criminal jury venires are almost totally male. To this
extent we cannot follow the contrary implications of the prior cases,
including Hoyt v. Florida.
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537.
50 419 U.S. 522 (1975). See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers,
Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation,41 MD.
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hold that women cannot be excluded from jury venires.5 1 The Taylor Court diverged from the reasoning of the Ballard Court, which
relied upon the intent of Congress,5 2 by reasoning that such exclusion violated defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an
impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of society. 53
Justice White, delivering the opinion in Taylor, explained that
women comprised over fifty percent of persons eligible forjury service in the Louisiana district, yet only ten percent of the group
from which the venire was selected were women.5 4 In fact, the Justice noted that in the case subjudice, no females were included in
the venire of 175 people.5 5 Relying on Ballard, in which the Court
decided the exact same issue upon non-constitutional grounds, the
Taylor Court first held that the systematic exclusion of women violates the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement." Justice White further held that although litigants do not have a right
to a jury of any certain composition, 7 the state may not exclude
women as a class or allow for automatic exemptions based on sex if
such exemptions result in all-male venires.5 8
L. REv. 337 (1982); Note, Peremptoiy Challenges and the Meaning ofJury Representation,89
YALE L.J. 1177 (1980).

51 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537. Similar to Hoyt, the statute in question in Taylor provided that a "'woman shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously
filed with the clerk of court of the parish in which she resides a written declaration of
her desire to be subject to jury service.'" Id. at 523 n.2 (quotation omitted). The
appellant, Taylor, argued that because the statute resulted in an all-male jury, it constituted a systematic exclusion of women from the jury. Id. at 524. Taylor further
claimed that the statute deprived him of his constitutional guarantee of ajury made
up of a representative cross-section of the community. Id.
52 See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
53 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525.
54 Id. at 524 (footnote omitted). The parties stipulated that the "discrepancy between females eligible for jury service and those actually included in the venire was
the result of the operation" of a Louisiana statute. Id. (citation omitted).
55 Id.

56 Id. at 531. The Court explained that:
Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community as well as impartial in a specific case ....

[T] he

broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly
as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.
Id. at 530-31 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original).
57 Id. at 538 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947)) (other citation
omitted). The Court explained that it was imposing "no requirement that petit juries
actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups
in the population." Id.
58 Id. at 537 (overruling Hoyt v. Florida); contra supra note 48 (discussing the facts
and holding of Hoyt). Justice White held that "the jury wheels, pools of names,
panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinc-

1994]

NOTE

767

Although the Strauder, Ballard, and Taylor Courts settled the
issue of intentional discrimination in preliminary jury selection
procedures, 9 the Supreme Court did not address the Fourteenth
Amendment implications of a prosecutor's use of the peremptory
challenge until 1965 in Swain v. Alabama.'° The Court reviewed
petitioner Swain's claim that the State violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by using its peremptory strikes to intentionally remove all six blacks from the final venire.6 1 Justice White, writing
for the majority, held that the striking of blacks in a particular case
is not a violation of equal protection.6 2 The Court also stated, howtive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative
thereof." Id. at 538.
59 See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531 (explaining that the systematic exclusion of women
from the venire violates the Sixth Amendment fair cross section requirement); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (holding that the intentional exclusion
of women from the jury panel violates congressional intent); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (determining that the exclusion of black men from
jury service solely on account of race is a denial of equal protection).
60 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See generally Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 50; Hon.
George Bundy Smith, Swain v. Alabama: The Use of Peremptoy Challenges to Strike Blacks
FromJuries, 27 How. L.J. 1571 (1984).
In Swain, a black man was convicted of rape and sentenced to death by an allwhite jury, even though there were eight blacks on the final venire. Swain, 380 U.S. at
203, 205. Of the eight blacks on the venire, two were exempt and the remaining six
were struck peremptorily by the prosecutor. Id. at 205. The petitioner claimed that
discrimination existed because black males made up 26% of the population eligible
for jury service, yet only constituted 10-15% of jury panels drawn since 1953, and
because no black person had ever actually served on a petit jury in Talladega County
since 1950. Id. at 205. Before discussing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Swain
Court addressed the issue of what constituted proof of discriminatory intent, and held
that a mere underrepresentation of blacks on ajury is not sufficient proof of a prosecutor's intent to discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 20809 (citations omitted). The Court began its analysis by examining the basic tenets of
jury selection and discrimination as determined by Strauder. Id. at 203. (citations
omitted). The Court reaffirmed that "'[f1or racial discrimination to result in the
exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.'" Id. at 204 (quoting Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)). Despite the Strauder Court's findings, however, the Swain
Court held that "purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely asserted."
Id. at 205. (citations omitted). Thus, the Court found that the average of six, seven,
or eight blacks on ajury panel does not constitute unlawful discrimination under the
case law of the Court. Id. at 206 (citations omitted). Although Alabama's juries did
contain an underrepresentation of black members, the Court explained that "a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate
number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury roll from
which petit juries are drawn." Id. at 208 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court held
that the underrepresentation of the black race by 10% does not prove purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 208-09 (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 210 (footnote omitted).
62 Id. at 221. The Court examined the "very old credentials" of the peremptory
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ever, that a prosecutor's systematic and intentional exclusion of
blacks from every jury panel might present a prima facie case under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 3 In those circumstances, Justice
White explained, the goals of the peremptory challenge would be
perverted.6 4 The Swain Court, however, did not pursue the issue
further because it found that the petitioner had not met its burden
of proof in showing a purposeful exclusion of blacks through the
use of the peremptory challenge.65
challenge. Id. at 212. Quoting Blackstone, Justice White explained: "'[I]n criminal
cases .. there is ...allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of
challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is
called a peremptoy challenge ... ' Id. at 212 n.9 (quoting 4 WijLLL BLACKSTrONE,
COMMENrARIES *353). The function of the peremptory challenge, the Court wrote, is
"not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties
that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence
placed before them, and not otherwise." Id. at 219. Thus, Justice White stated that
the peremptory is "exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court's control," and is often based upon the "'sudden impressions and the unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks
and gestures of another.'" Id. at 220 (citations and quotation omitted). Furthermore,
the Justice emphasized that the challenge may be exercised "on grounds normally
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion,
nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty." Id. (footnote omitted). Relying on these notions, the Swain Court held that a prosecutor's use
of the peremptory challenge against blacks in a particularcase does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 221.
63 Id. at 224. The petitioner argued that because no black person had ever served
on a petit jury in a civil or criminal case in Talladega County, prosecutors were consistently and systematically excluding blacks from juries by using the peremptory challenge in a way contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 22223. The Court held that while "'l[t] he fact that the prosecution peremptorily strikes
every Negro from the jury panel in a case where the defendant is a Negro does not
constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights,'" a prosecutor's peremptory removal of every black eligible for service in every case, so that no black
person ever serves on a jury, "takes on added significance." Id. at 223 & n.30 (quotation omitted).
64 Id. at 223-24. Justice White elaborated:
[i]f the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a
criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be
overcome. Such proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is
being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population.
These ends the peremptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or
justify.
Id. at 224.
65 Id. at 226. Justice White explained that:
Absent a showing of purposeful exclusion of Negroes in the selection of
veniremen, which has not been made, the lower proportion of Negroes
on the venire list sheds no light whatsoever on the validity of the per-
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The Swain Court's holding remained good' law until 1986
when the Court altered the decision in Batson v. Kentucky.66 Batson
emptory strike system or on whether the prosecutor systematically
strikes Negroes in the county.
Id. at 228 n.32.
In a powerful dissenting opinion, Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas, explained that the majority, despite purporting to rely on
Strauder, essentially departed from that case's basic holding. Id. at 231 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Goldberg reiterated that Strauder stands for the notion that,
under the Equal Protection Clause, a state may not exclude persons from a jury
merely because of their race. Id. at 229 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted). The Swain dissent asserted that the petitioner did in fact present a prima facie
case of intentional discrimination by showing that no black had ever served on a petit
jury in Talladega County. Id. at 238 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice
Goldberg propounded:
I deplore the Court's departure from its holding[ ] in Strauder ... By
affirming petitioner's conviction on this clear record of jury exclusion
because of race, the Court condones the highly discriminatory procedures used in Talladega County under which Negroes never have served
on any petit jury in that county. By adding to the present heavy burden
of proof required of defendants in these cases, the Court creates additional barriers to the elimination of practices which have operated in
many communities throughout the Nation to nullify the command of
the Equal Protection Clause in this important area in the administration
of justice.
Id. at 246 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
66 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); see Swain, 380 U.S. at 221 (holding that the striking of
blacks in a particular case is not a denial of equal protection); supra notes 60-65 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Swain). For a more detailed
analysis of the Batson decision, see generally Underwood, supra note 31; J. Christopher
Peters, Note, Georgia v. McCollum: It's Strike Threefor Peremptory Challenges, But is it the
Bottom of the Ninth?, 53 LA. L. REv. 1723 (1993).
The Batson Court noted that the Swain holding had been widely commented
upon. Batson, 476 U.S. at 90 n.14 (citing Roger C. Harper, Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. Rv. 1357, 1375 (1985) (arguing that the
Swain Court's presumption that the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge is
non-discriminatory "has been an insurmountable barrier to a successful equal protection challenge"); Imlay, supra note 2, at 270 (stating that "given the license of the
Swain decision, it [the peremptory challenge] is probably the single most significant
means by which [ I prejudice and bias is injected into the jury selection system");
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A ConstitutionalBlueprintfor the Perpetuation of the AllWhite Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157, 1175 (1966) (explaining that "[tihe Court in Swain...
threw up its hands in the face of the[ ] problems [resulting from the decision], and in
effect handed the states a blank check for discrimination")) (other citations omitted).
The Court observed that some commentators, on the other hand, have urged the
Court to adhere to Swain's holding. Id. (citing Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 50).
Saltzburg and Powers maintained that:
the recent decisions prohibiting the use of certain traits as grounds for
peremptorily challenging jurors are misconceived . . . and . . .in the
long run... may do more harm to the litigation process than does the
Swain rule. There are problems with peremptory challenges, but they
are not those superficially identified in the recent cases that stand in
opposition to Swain.
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 50, at 338-39.
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involved a criminal trial of a black man in which the prosecutor
used peremptory challenges to remove all four blacks from the venire.6 7 Batson, the petitioner, challenged the State's practice
under the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section requirement as
well as under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.68
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, began by reaffirming the
principle announced in Strauder that the Fourteenth Amendment
prevents a state from purposefully excluding a potential juror because of that person's race.69 In a departure from its holding in
Swain, however, the Court determined that a state's ability to strike
potential jurors is governed by the Equal Protection Clause, just as
discrimination in the selection of the venire is prohibited by the
Clause. 70 Thus, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
prevents a prosecutor from challenging jurors solely on the basis of
race or based on the presumption that, as a group, black jurors will
Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. The petitioner conceded that Swain allowed the State to
use the peremptory challenge against potential jurors solely because of race in an
individual trial. Id. Batson asked the Court to adopt the decisions of other states,
however, and to hold that such practices violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 518 (Mass.) (holding that defendants
"made a prima facie showing of improper exercise of peremptory challenges on the
basis of group membership, and shifted the burden to the prosecutor to justify his
challenges as predicated not on group affiliation, but on individual characteristics
specific to each group member excluded"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979)); People
v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 766 (1978) (concluding that defendants "made a prima
facie showing that the prosecutor was exercising peremptory challenges against black
jurors on the ground of group bias alone"). Additionally, the petitioner attempted to
prove that the State had implemented a "pattern" of discrimination in its use of the
peremptory challenge, thus establishing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
under Swain. Id. at 83-84.
69 Id. at 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879)). The Court
explained that Strauder"laidthe foundation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire from which individual jurors are drawn." Id. Relying on Thiel and Ballard, the Court explained that
racial discrimination harms more than just the accused: "The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded
juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude
black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system
ofjustice." Id. at 87 (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)) (other
citation omitted).
70 See id. at 91, 97 (citations omitted). Relying on the basic tenets of earlier cases,
the Court overruled the portion of Swain that allowed the prosecutor to use the peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Id. at 96. The Court did not, however, express any opinion as to whether the holding should apply to defendants' exercise of
the peremptory challenge. See id. at 89. But see infra notes 80-96 and accompanying
text (discussing the extension of Batson to a criminal defendant's use of the peremptory challenge).
67
68
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be unable to remain neutral when the defendant is also black."

The Batson Court also departed from the holding in Swain by
concluding-that a defendant may use evidence of the prosecutor's

use of the peremptory challenge to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. 7 2 In determining whether the defendant has met his burden of proof, the Court advised, the trial court

must take all relevant circumstances into account; one such relevant circumstance would be a pattern of challenges against a group
that might raise an inference of discrimination. 7 3 Finally, the
Court emphasized that the peremptory challenge is an important
part of the trial process and explained that its holding was not
meant to thwart the contribution that the challenge makes to the
justice system.7 4
Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Justice Powell rejected the "assumption that black jurors
as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." Id.
72 Id. at 96. Justice Powell noted that in Swain, the Court held that a black defendant could only establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by proving
that the system in general was being perverted. Id. at 91 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 224 (1965)). The Batson Court, however, lessened the burden on the defendant by reaffirming subsequent decisions holding that the "'total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires,' [ ] 'is itself such an "unequal
application of the law.., as to show intentional discrimination."'" Id. at 93 (quoting
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 242 (1976)).
More specifically, the Court relied upon Castanedav. Partidato reiterate the standards for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 96 (citing Castaneda
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977)). First, the defendant must show "that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group, . . . and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race." Id.
(citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494). Second, the defendant may rely on the undisputed fact that the peremptory challenge allows "'those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate.'" Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
Finally, the defendant must prove that "these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race." Id.
73 Id. at 96-97. Once the defendant has established this requisite showing of purposeful discrimination, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to provide a raceneutral explanation for striking the black juror. Id. at 97. The Court explained that
the prosecutor's reason need not, however, "rise to the level justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause." Id. (citations omitted).
74 Id. at 98-99. Justice Rehnquist, however, did not share the Court's optimism
concerning the effect of the holding on the future of the peremptory challenge. See
id. at 134 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Justice maintained that "'[t]o subject the
prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and
operation of the challenge. The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremp71

tory. .

. .'"

Id. at 136 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22).

Chief Justice Burger shared Justice Rehnquist's skepticism in a separate dissenting opinion. See id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Specifically,
Chief Justice Burger explained that if racial classifications in the exercise of the per-
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A few years after the Court radically changed its interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to a state's exercise of
the peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court considered a series
of cases questioning the application and limits of the Batson rule. 5
In the first of these cases, Powers v. Ohio, 76 the Court considered the
issue of whether a criminal defendant may question the prosecution's race-based peremptory strike if the defendant and the
stricken juror are of different races.7 7 The Court relied on Batson
v. Kentucky, where the defendant and the challenged juror were
both black, to hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a
state from using the peremptory challenge to exclude otherwise
qualified jurors solely on the basis of race, regardless of whether
the defendant and the excluded juror share the same race.7 8
Two months after its holding in Powers, the Court, in Edmonson
emptory challenge are subject to equal protection analysis, so then would classifications based upon sex or upon mental capacity. Id. at 124 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
(citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976)) (other citations omitted). The ChiefJustice explained that
"[iln short, it is quite probable that every peremptory challenge could be objected to
on the basis that, because it excluded a venireman who had some characteristic not
shared by the remaining members of the venire, it constituted a 'classification' subject
to equal protection scrutiny." Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, the Chief Justice
contended that to allow inquiry into the reasons behind a prosecutor's use of the
peremptory challenge "would force 'the peremptory challenge [to] collapse into the
challenge for cause.'" Id. at 127 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
75 See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause prevents a criminal defendant's discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (deciding that private civil litigants may not exercise the peremptory challenge in a
discriminatory manner); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at
98-99 (holding that Batson applies whether or not defendant and excluded juror
share the same race); infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text (explaining the
Court's extension of Batson in subsequent case law).
76 499 U.S. 400 (1991). See generally Underwood, supra note 31; Bradley R Kirk,
Note, Milking the New Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the Peremptory Challenge on
Racial Grounds in Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 19 PEPP. L.
Rxv. 691 (1992).
77 Powers, 499 U.S. at 404 (citation omitted). In Powers, a white man objected to
the State's use of peremptory strikes against black men, and asked the trial court to
compel the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation for each strike. Id. at
402, 403. The trial court overruled the petitioner's objections and denied his request
for race-neutral explanations. Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at 415. First, the Court noted that while the Powers petition for certiorari was
pending, the Court decided Holland v. Illinois, and held that the Sixth Amendment
does not prevent the prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors whose race differs from that of the defendant. Id. at 403-04 (citing Holland
v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990)). Five members of the Holland Court, however, concluded that a defendant might successfully object to the discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge on equal protection grounds. Id. at 404 (citing Holland, 493
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v. Leesville Concrete Co., 79 decided the issue of whether a private
party in a civil proceeding may use the peremptory challenge to
exclude jurors solely on the basis of race." ° The Court cited the
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the proposition that private parties, when exercising the peremptory challenge, become state actors for equal protection purposes.8 ' Justice
Kennedy, relying upon Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,8 2 held that Leesville Concrete's peremptory challenges were made "pursuant to a
course of state action" and therefore violated excluded jurors' constitutional rights.8 3
Similarly, one year later in Georgia v. McCollum, 4 the Court
considered whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents a criminal defendant from exercising race-based peremptory challenges.8 5
U.S. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 493 U.S. at 491 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined
by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.); 493 U.S. at 507 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
In Powers, the Court found that a criminal defendant "suffers a real injury when
the prosecutor excludes jurors at his or her own trial on account of race." Powers, 499
U.S. at 413. Therefore, the Court explained, "[b]oth the excluded juror and the
criminal defendant have a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from
the courtroom," thus making it "necessary and appropriate for the defendant to raise
the rights of the juror." Id. at 413-14. The Court concluded that the fact that the
defendant and the excluded juror were of different races was irrelevant to the defendant's standing to object to the race-based exclusion of the juror. Id. at 415.
79 500 U.S. 614 (1991). See generally Cynthia L. Eldridge, Note, Peremptoy Challenges
in Civil Cases-DoesEdmonson Alleviate RacialDiscriminationin the Jury Selection Process?,
13 Miss. C. L. Rv. 261 (1992); Kirk, supra note 76.
80 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616. In Edmonson, respondent Leesville Concrete used
two out of its three peremptory strikes to exclude black persons from the venire. Id.
The district court refused Edmonson's request that Leesville provide race-neutral explanations for the strikes. Id. at 617. Specifically, the district court held that Batson
does not apply in civil cases involving private parties. Id. Consequently, the court
empaneled ajury that included only one black person. Id.
81 Id. at 617 (citation omitted). The Court explained that "to limit Batson to criminal cases 'would betray Batson's fundamental principle [that] the state's use, toleration, and approval of peremptory challenges based on race violates the equal
protection clause.'" Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
83 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616, 622. The Supreme Court relied upon Lugarto deter82

mine "where the governmental sphere ends and the private sphere begins." Id. at
620. In Lugar, the Court considered what constituted state action by asking first
'whether the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority. The second question is whether, under the facts
of this case.... private parties[ I may be appropriately characterized as 'state actors.'"
Lugar,457 U.S. at 939. Finding that the Lugar test was satisfied in Edmonson, the Court
held that the petitioner was a state actor for equal protection purposes, and was therefore prohibited from exercising the peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory
manner. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616, 622.
84 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992). See generaUy Peters, supra note 66; Salvatore Picariello,
Note, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 1160 (1993).
85

McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2351.
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Justice Blackmun explained that the Court must consider four factors in deciding whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids criminal defendants from engaging in such challenges.8 6 First, the
Justice asked whether a criminal defendant's use of race-based
challenges causes the injury addressed by Batson.17 Second, the
Court examined whether the defendant's use of the peremptory
challenge constitutes state action. 8 Third, Justice Blackmun asked
whether the prosecutor had standing to object to the peremptory
strike.8 9 Finally, the Court questioned whether the criminal defendant's constitutional rights should override the extension of
Batson to criminal defendants.9 0 Relying on Lugar,Powers, and Edmonson, the Court found that the State met each element of this
four part test, and therefore demonstrated a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination by the defendant. 1 Accordingly, the
Id. at 2353.
Id. Justice Blackmun noted that "[a]s long ago as Strauder, this Court recognized that denying a person participation injury service on account of his race unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror," and harms not only the
defendant but "'extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded
juror to touch the entire community.'" Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
87 (1986); citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)). Thus, the
Court declared that whether it is done by "the State or the defense, if a court allows
jurors to be excluded because of group bias, it is a willing participant in a scheme that
could only undermine the very foundation of our system ofjustice-our citizens' confidence in it." Id. at 2354.
88 Id. Relying on Lugar, the Court considered whether the constitutional deprivation was a consequence of a state authorized right or privilege, and whether the party
accused of the deprivation could logically be classified as a state actor. Id. at 2355
(citing Lugar,457 U.S. at 941-42). Finding that the State proved both of these factors,
the McCollum Court held that criminal defendants are state actors for equal protection purposes, and thus the defendant's race-based peremptory strikes violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2355, 2357 (citations omitted).
89 Id. at 2357. Relying on Powers, the Court held that "[a]s the representative of all
its citizens, the State is the logical and proper party to assert the invasion of the constitutional rights of the excluded jurors in a criminal trial." Id.
90 Id. at 2357-58. The Court stated that the final question of "whether the interests
served by Batson must give way to the rights of a criminal defendant" depends upon
whether peremptory challenges are fundamental rights subject to constitutional protection. Id. The Court held that "the right to a peremptory challenge may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury
and a fair trial." Id. at 2358 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court concluded that
because the defendant possesses no absolute right to the peremptory challenge, the
interests served by Batson and protected by the Constitution preclude a criminal defendant from using the challenge in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 2358,
2359.
91 Id. at 2353-59. The Court held that "the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the
exercise of peremptory challenges." Id. at 2359. The Court concluded that peremptory strikes "must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes
held by the party." Id.
86
87

1994]

NOTE

775

Court determined that under the Batson rule, the defendant was
required to provide a race-neutral explanation for the use of a peremptory challenge.9"
Amid this debate over the Fourteenth Amendment's applicability to gender and race discrimination in both venire selection
and litigants' exercise of the peremptory challenge, the Court decided JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, addressed the question of whether Batson's prohibition of intentional discrimination on the basis of race should be
extended to gender.9 4 The Court answered in the affirmative,
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the exercise of
gender-based peremptory challenges. 9
The majority prefaced its analysis by explaining that beginning
with Batson, the Court has repeatedly strived to achieve fair and
nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures.9" Justice Blackmun
recognized, however, that recent case law has dealt primarily with
92 Id. at 2353, 2359 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986)) (footnote
omitted). Justice Thomas, although concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to
express a "general dissatisfaction with [the Court's] continuing attempts to use the
Constitution to regulate peremptory challenges." Id. at 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Admonishing the Court's departure from the basic holding
of Strauder (in that McCollum restricts criminal defendants' use of the peremptory
challenge and thus elevates the rights of the juror above those of the criminal defendant), the Justice pronounced that "I am certain that black criminal defendants will
rue the day that this court ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the
elimination of peremptory strikes." Id. at 2359-60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)).
Additionally, Justice Thomas concluded that the Court's decision created an "inquiry that ha[s] no clear stopping point." Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thus,
the Justice predicted that "[e]ventually, we will have to decide whether black defendants may strike white veniremen ....Next will come the question whether defendants
may exercise peremptories on the basis of sex." Id. at 2360-61 (citation and footnote
omitted).
93 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
94 Id. at 1421.
95 Id. at 1422.
96 Id. at 1421. Justice Blackmun began the Court's historical analysis by noting
that while a defendant has "'no right to a "petit jury composed in whole or in part of
persons of his own race"' ... the 'defendant does have the right to be tried by ajury
whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.'" Id. (quoting
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305
(1879))). Additionally, the Court recognized that under the authority of Powers, Edmonson, and McCollum, the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of discrimination
applies regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal, and that "potential
jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures
that are free from state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice." Id. (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991)).
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the race-based exclusion of jurors.9 7 The Justice noted that the
gender-based peremptory strike is a recent phenomenon. 98
Relying on this foundation, the Court analyzed the level of
scrutiny afforded classifications based on gender.9 9 Justice Blackmun explained that beginning with Reed v. Reed,10 ° the Court has
97 Id. at 1421.
98 Id. at 1421, 1422. Justice Blackmun explained that gender-based peremptory
challenges "were hardly practicable for most of our country's existence, since, until
the 19th century, women were completely excluded from jury service." Id. at 1422
(footnote omitted). In fact, the Justice commented that "[s]o well-entrenched was
this exclusion of women that in 1880 this Court, while finding that the exclusion of
African-American men from juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment, expressed
no doubt that a State 'may confine the selection [ofjurors] to males.'" Id. at 1422-23
(second alteration in original) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310
(1879)) (other citations omitted).
Thus, the Justice began the Court's analysis with a comprehensive historical survey of cases confronting the exclusion of women from thejury. See id. at 1423 (citing
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947);
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310). Justice Blackmun explained that it was not until 1946, in
Ballard v. United States, that the Court first questioned the constitutionality of depriving women of the right ofjury service, and held that defendants do not receive a fair
trial if women are excluded from jury panels. Id. at 1424. (citing Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)). The Court recognized, however, that even after
women were granted the right to sit on juries, many states continued to exclude women by allowing "exemptions" to women that were intended to deter them from service. Id. at 1423 (citing Fay, 332 U.S. at 289).
The rationale for such exclusion, the Court explained, originated in the English
common law, which excluded women because of "'the doctrine of propter defectum
sexus, literally, the "defect of sex."'" Id. (quoting United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d
1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quotation omitted)) (footnote omitted).
The Court explained that in the United States, however, the practice of excluding women from juries was based upon the "ostensible need to protect women from
the ugliness and depravity of trials." Id. (citing Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424, 428
(Ark. 1949) ("Criminal court trials often involve testimony of the foulest kind, and
they sometimes require consideration of indecent conduct, the use of filthy and loathsome words, references to intimate sex relationships, and other elements that would
prove humiliating, embarrassing and degrading to a lady."); Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall.
130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself,
has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man
and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and.
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life.")) (other citation omitted).
99 Id. at 1424.
100 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, Chief Justice Burger decided the constitutionality
of a section of the Idaho Code. Id. at 74 (footnote omitted). The Court explained
that section 15-312 "designate[d] the persons who are entitled to administer the estate of one who dies intestate," and provided "'[o]f several persons claiming and
equally entitled ...to administer, males must be preferred to females.. . .'" Id. at 7273 (quotation omitted). The Court reversed the decision of the Idaho Supreme
Court and held that the challenged section violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause and was therefore void. Id. at 74 (footnote omitted).
In its analysis, the Court noted that section 15-312 mandated preferential treatment to males solely on the basis of sex, "thus establish[ing] a classification subject to
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applied heightened scrutiny to gender-based classifications.10'
This heightened scrutiny, the Court stated, functions to limit the
exercise of government policies premised on gender-based
stereotypes.' 0 2
While the majority stipulated that the experiences of racial minorities and women have been different, the Court claimed that
the similarities between the discriminatory histories of the two

groups negate those differences.'

Justice Blackmun, however,

found it unnecessary to determine whether racial minorities or wo-

men have suffered more from state-sponsored discrimination, and
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 75. The ChiefJustice also recognized that although states may treat different classes of people in different ways, the
Equal Protection Clause forbids states from legislating differential treatment of classes
"on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute." Id. at 75-76
(citations omitted). Applying heightened scrutiny to the classification, the Court explained that it "'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' Id. at 76 (quotation
omitted). Failing to find a rational relationship between any legitimate state objective
and the statute in question, the Court held that the statute made an "arbitrary legislative choice" solely on the basis of sex, and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 76-77.
101 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
102 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424 (citations omitted). Relying on Craig, the Court explained that it will apply heightened scrutiny "in recognition of the real danger that
government policies that professedly are based on reasonable considerations in fact
may be reflective of 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations about gender . . . or
based on 'outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home
rather than in the "marketplace and world of ideas .... Id. at 1424-25 (quoting Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976) (citations omitted)) (other citation omitted).
In Craig, the petitioner asked the Court to declare invalid an Oklahoma statute
providing different drinking ages for men and women. Craig, 429 U.S. at 192. The
Court, relying on Reed, declared that statutory classifications based on gender are governed by the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore must "serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 197 (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 75). The majority also noted that
decisions following Reed have applied the two-prong heightened scrutiny test. Id. at
198 (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975)) (other citations omitted). Finding statistical evidence regarding the State's purported interest (traffic safety) and its
correlation to gender unconvincing, the Court held that the Oklahoma statute invidiously discriminated against men aged 18-20 in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 204.
103 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 (quoting Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1920, 1921 (1992)). Expanding this proposition, the Court relied upon Frontiero v. Richardson, stating that "'[T]hroughout much
of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes." Id. (quoting Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (plurality opinion)). Justice Blacknun elaborated: "[c] ertainly, with respect to jury service, African-Americans and women share a
history of total exclusion, a history which came to end for women many years after the
embarrassing chapter in our history came to an end for African-Americans." Id.
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concluded instead that the nation's long history of sex discrimination justifies the heightened scrutiny afforded all classifications
based on gender. 10 4 Recognizing that the only legitimate interest
that the litigant may possess lies in the desire to obtain a fair and
impartial trial, 10 5 the Court held that peremptory challenges based
on gender are not substantially related to any important governmental interest and, therefore, fail the heightened scrutiny test. 10 6
The Court next addressed the respondent's claim that men
and women view certain issues differently, thereby justifying the
gender-based peremptory challenge.10 7 Justice Blackmun ultimately rejected the respondent's argument, asserting that the
Court will not allow the stereotype that men and women possess
different world views to serve as a defense to gender-based peremptory strikes. 0 8s Justice Blackmun explained that the jurisprudence
in this area confirms that gender classifications premised on stereo104 Id. (quoting Frontiero,411 U.S. at 684). Justice Blackmun explained that under
the Court's recent "equal protection jurisprudence, gender-based classifications require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)) (other
citations omitted).
For a more detailed discussion of the levels of scrutiny applied in equal protection analysis, see generally Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Ruv. 1 (1972).
105 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426 & n.8 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 620 (1991) ("'[The] sole purpose [of the peremptory challenge] is to permit litigants to assist the government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact.'")).
106 Id. at 1425-26. Accordingly, the Court refused to decide whether gender-based
classifications are inherently suspect, thereby deserving strict scrutiny. Id. at 1425 n.6
(citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.9 (holding that a state-sponsored school's policy of
denying admission to men does not serve any legitimate state interest, and asserting
that the Court "need not decide whether classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect"); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975) (finding "it unnecessary in
this case to decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently suspect"))
(other citation omitted).
107 Id. at 1426 & n.9 (quoting REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 140 (1983)
("Neither student nor citizen judgments for typical criminal case material have revealed differences between male and female verdict preferences .... The picture differs [only] for rape cases, where female jurors appear to be somewhat more
conviction-prone than male jurors.")). The Court observed, however, that the majority of studies have found that gender plays no significant role in a juror's verdict. Id.
at 1426 n.9 (quoting VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 76 (1986)
("[I]n the majority of studies there are no significant differences in the way men and
women perceive and react to trials .... ")).
108 Id. at 1426 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). Justice Blackmun declared that the Court would "not accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns."' Id. (quoting Powers, 499 U.S.
at 410). The Court explained that respondent's rationale that gender is an "accurate
predictor ofjuror's attitudes" was similar to the arguments proffered decades ago to
exclude women from jury service. Id. at 1426-27 (footnote omitted). Accepting this
argument, Justice Blackmun explained, would require the Court to hold that "gross
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types, even if statistically supported, violate equal protection.1 0 9
The majority observed that discriminatory jury selection procedures harm not only the litigants, but also the community and
the wrongfully excluded jurors. 11 0 Additionally, the Court explained, the fact that the discriminatory practice was directed at
men in this case, rather than at women, did not exempt it from the
heightened scrutiny afforded all gender-based classifications. 11 In
light of these determinations, the Court concluded that, like race,
gender is an unconstitutional measure of juror competence and
impartiality.1 12 Justice Blackmun elaborated that the opportunity
to participate in government through the jury system is essential to
a democratic society.11 3 Therefore, the Court held that the basic
promise of the Equal Protection Clause would be violated were the
Court to allow the State to exclude jurors solely on account of gender-based assumptions regarding a juror's ability and
generalizations that would be deemed impermissible if made on the basis of race are
somehow permissible when made on the basis of gender." Id. at 1427.
109 Id. at 1427 n.lI (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201 (1976) (holding that
an Oklahoma law providing different drinking ages for males and females is invalid
despite evidence described as "'not trivial in a statistical sense'"); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (declaring that the Social Security Act, which provided benefits to widows but denied them to widowers, is unconstitutional even
though the rationale for the classification was "'not entirely without empirical
support'")).
110 Id. at 1427.
111 Id. at 1428 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723
(1982) (determining that the state's "discrimination] against males rather than
against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review"))
(other citation omitted). Thus, the Court rejected the respondent's argument that
men, because they have not historically suffered discrimination based on gender,
should be denied constitutional protection in jury selection. Id.
Justice Blackmun also rejected the " popular refrain that all peremptory challenges are based on stereotypes of some kind," and noted that peremptories based on
"group characteristics other than race or gender... do not reinforce the same stereotypes about the group's competence or predispositions that have been used to prevent them from voting, participating on ju.ies, pursuing their chosen professions, or
otherwise contributing to civic life." Id. at 1428 n.14. (citing Barbara Allen Babcock,
A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights andJury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1139, 1173
(1993)).
112 Id. at 1421. Justice Blackmun emphasized that the Court's decision "does not
imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges." Id. at 1429. Additionally, the
Justice explained, litigants may still use the peremptory challenge to strike groups of
jurors who would normally be subject to rational basis review. Id. (citing Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985)) (other citation omitted). Justice
Blackmun asserted that "[e]ven strikes based on characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one gender could be appropriate, absent a showing of pretext." Id. (footnote omitted).
113 Id. at 1430 (footnote omitted).

780

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:756

impartiality.' 14
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
Court's holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids statesponsored gender discrimination.:1 5 The Justice wrote separately,
however, to stress that the majority's holding was not without
1 16
costs.
Most importantly, the Justice asserted, while the Court
may have succeeded in eliminating gender-based discrimination, it
also dealt a serious blow to the peremptory challenge by further
constitutionalizing the practice.117 For this reason, Justice
O'Connor contended, the Court's holding should apply only to
the government's exercise of gender-based peremptory strikes,
thus shielding private civil litigants' or criminal defendants' use of
the challenge from constitutional scrutiny.1 8
114 Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986)). Accordingly, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama and remanded
the case for further proceedings. Id.
115 Id. at 1430 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
116 Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J.,concurring). Justice O'Connor explained that both
Batson mini-hearings and Batson appeals were already commonplace in the courts. Id.
Thus, the Justice maintained, by "further constitutionalizing jury selection procedures, the Court increases the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-will become part of the main event." Id.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor reiterated that the "'essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court's control.'" Id. (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 220 (1965)). Justice O'Connor explained that simply because an attorney
cannot meet the standard necessary to strike the juror for cause "does not mean that
the lawyer's instinct is erroneous." Id. Therefore, the Justice determined that "as we
add, layer by layer, additional constitutional restraints on the use of the peremptory,
we force lawyers to articulate what we know is often inarticulable." Id. In so doing,
the Justice explained, the peremptory becomes more of a challenge for cause than a
discretionary device. Id. Furthermore, the Justice contended, the Court's holding
will "increase the possibility that biased jurors will be allowed onto the jury, because
sometimes a lawyer will be unable to provide an acceptable gender-neutral explanation even though the lawyer is in fact correct that the juror is unsympathetic." Id.
Justice O'Connor next discussed the correlation between gender and jurors' attitudes. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justice maintained that litigants'
gender-based assumptions may often be accurate:
We know that like race, gender matters .... [O]ne need not be a sexist
to share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case. "'Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all
that their human experience has taught them.'"
Id. (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980)) (other citation omitted).
Consequently, Justice O'Connor asserted, the extension of Batson to gender is costly
in that it burdens the court system, brings us one step closer to the demise of the
peremptory challenge, and precludes litigants from acting on what are sometimes
correct gender-based assumptions about jurors' beliefs. Id.
117 See id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justice contended that the Court
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Justice Kennedy, also concurring with the majority opinion,
wrote separately to emphasize why precedent made the Court's
holding necessary.11 9 The Justice joined the Court's holding that
gender-based peremptory strikes violate the Constitution. 2 ° Additionally, Justice Kennedy stressed that the Court's holding should
serve to encourage jurors who are chosen by non-discriminatory
means to likewise refrain from resorting to racial or gender bias in
jury deliberations.'
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the significant differences between gender and race discrimination demonstrate that Batson should not be extended to gender-based
peremptory challenges.' 2 2 Unlike the majority, the Chief Justice
"made the mistake of concluding that private civil litigants were state actors when they
exercised peremptory challenges" in Edmonson, and then "compounded the mistake
by holding that criminal defendants were also state actors" in McCollum. Id. (citing
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991)). The Justice stressed that not everything that happens in the
court system can be called state action. Id. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor maintained that the Equal Protection Clause should not preclude criminal defendants and
private civil litigants from exercising gender-based peremptory challenges. Id. at 1433
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
119 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120 See id. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring). First, Justice Kennedy observed that
"[iun recognition of the evident historical fact that the Equal Protection Clause was
adopted to prohibit government discrimination on the basis of race, the Court most
often interpreted it in the decades that followed in accord with that purpose." Id. at
1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The Justice recounted that "much time passed before the Equal Protection
Clause was thought to reach beyond the purpose of prohibiting racial discrimination
and to apply as well to discrimination based on sex." Id. Relying on this history, the
Justice concluded that "there is no doubt under [the Court's] precedents.., that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex discrimination in the selection of jurors." Id.
(citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975)).
121 Id. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explained that:
[o]nce seated, ajuror should not give free rein to some racial or gender
bias of his or her own. The jury system is a kind of compact by which
power is transferred from the judge to jury, the jury in turn deciding the
case in accord with the instructions defining the relevant issues for consideration. The wise limitation on the authority of courts to inquire
into the reasons underlying a jury's verdict does not mean that a jury
ought to disregard the court's instructions. Ajuror who allows racial or
gender bias to influence assessment of the case breaches the compact
and renounces his or her oath.
Id.
122 Id. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist elaborated
that equal protection jurisprudence shows that the differences between race and gender justify the different degrees of protection afforded each group. Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Race-based classifications, the Chief Justice explained, "are
inherently suspect, triggering 'strict scrutiny,'" while classifications based on gender
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asserted that gender-based peremptory strikes do "'substantially
further"' the legitimate state interest of ensuring fair and impartial
trials. 2 3 Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that the
does not mandate the extension of Batson beyond
Constitution
4
2

race. 1

Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas,
also dissented from the Court's holding. 125 First,Justice Scalia contended that the petitioner did not suffer any injury. 126 SecondJustice Scalia explained that because all groups were subject to the
1 27
peremptory challenge, no group was denied equal protection.
Additionally, Justice Scalia posited that a woman who is struck from
a venire because of stereotypes regarding her qualifications to
serve as a juror suffers a real harm, while a woman struck peremp"are judged under a heightened, but less searching standard of review." Id. (citing
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). Additionally, the
Justice averred, all of the Court's post-Batson decisions have involved race-based peremptory challenges and "have described Batson as fashioning a rule aimed at preventing purposeful discrimination against a cognizable racial group." Id. (emphasis
added) (citing McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616; Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476-477 (1990))
(other citations omitted).
123 Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 118-20 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
124 Id. at 1435-36 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded
that "the Constitution simply does not require the result which [the Court] reaches."
Id. at 1436 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
125 Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia observed that the petitioner
had the opportunity to, and in fact did, strike women from the jury. Id. at 1436
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Consequently, the dissent argued that the petitioner, a state
actor under Edmonson and McCollum, "actually inflicted the harm on female jurors." Id.
at 1437 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (citing McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2352; Edmonson, 500 U.S.
at 626-27) (footnote omitted). In so doing, the Justice posited, the Court "accord[ed]
petitioner a remedy because of the wrong done to male jurors" under a "uniquely
expansive" reading of third-party standing. Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
415 (1991)).
127 Id. (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 423-24 (ScaliaJ., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 137-38 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). The justice argued that:
[s]ince all groups are subject to the peremptory challenge (and will be
made the object of it, depending upon the nature of the particular
case) it is hard to see how any group is denied equal protection ....
That explains why peremptory challenges coexisted with the Equal Protection Clause for 120 years. This case is a perfect example of how the
system as a whole is even-handed ....
[Flor every man struck by the
government petitioner's own lawyer struck a woman.
Id. (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 423-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Batson, 476 U.S. at 137-38
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). The Justice explained that there could only be a denial
of equal protection if both sides had intentionally struck members of a group "so that
the strikes evinced group-based animus and served as a proxy for segregated venire
lists." Id. (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24).
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torily because of doubt that she, as an individual, lacks impartiality
does not.

128

Justice Scalia, like Justice O'Connor, observed that the majority's holding damaged the peremptory challenge system. 129 The
Justice asserted that the demise of the "real peremptory" will affect
the criminal defendant most dramatically."' Justice Scalia exhistoriplained that the Court's holding harmed a practice that has
13 1
cally been considered the cornerstone of a fair jury trial.
While the JE.B. Court reached the only politically correct decision in its effort to abolish discrimination from the courtroom, it
ignored the fact that the decision contradicts the very nature of the
peremptory challenge. The peremptory challenge, hailed as the
most important right afforded litigants, has repeatedly been de3 2
fined as a challenge based upon prejudice and discrimination.1
128 Id. (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The Justice elaborated: "[t]here is discrimination and dishonor in the former, and not in the latterwhich explains the 106-year interlude between [the Court's] holding that exclusion
from juries on the basis of race was unconstitutional . . . and [the Court's] holding
that peremptory challenges on the basis of race were unconstitutional." Id. at 1437-38
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879);
Batson, 476 U.S. at 89).
129 Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice maintained that:
much damage has been done. It has been done, first and foremost, to
the peremptory challenge system, which loses its whole character when
(in order to defend against 'impermissible stereotyping' claims) 'reasons' for strikes must be given .... And damage has been done, secondarily, to the entire justice system, which will bear the burden of the
expanded quest for 'reasoned peremptories' that the Court demands.
Id. at 1438, 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348
(1992)).
131 Id. at 1439 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). The Justice declared that "[t]he Constitution
of the United States neither requires nor permits this vandalizing of our people's
traditions." Id.
132 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)); see also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)
(stating that the peremptory challenge is often based upon the "sudden impressions
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another"). Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Batson, explained that "'to
enunciate [these prejudices] in the concrete expression required of a challenge for
cause is societally divisive. Instead we have evolved in the peremptory challenge a
system that allows the covert expression of what we dare not say but know is true more
often than not.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Barbara
Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 553-54
(1975)). In fact, before the recent case law overruling Swain, the Court recognized
that the peremptory challenge was "frequently exercised on grounds normally
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion,
nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty." Swain, 380
U.S. at 220 (footnote omitted).
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Thus, the Court's recent rulings, which disallow peremptories
based on race and gender while allowing them if premised on
other permissible prejudices, are illogical and incomplete.
The Court has taken a further step toward banning peremptories entirely, 133 yet has chosen again to walk the middle road: on
the surface the Court praised the peremptory challenge as an important right, while in practice the Court struck a severe blow to
the challenge. Thus, the Court continued to avoid condemning
the exercise of the challenge as inherently biased, while simultaneously chipping away at its effectiveness. In so doing, the Court ignored the critical issue of whether peremptory challenges truly
serve the function for which they were created: to ensure a fair
and impartial jury trial.1 34 Until the Court confronts this basic issue, the peremptory challenge's place in the system will remain
135
confused and uncertain.
133 Although the immediate implication of the Court's recent decisions is a remedy
of discrimination in the courtroom, the long term effect is a blow to the peremptory
challenge. See Bray, supra note 2, at 568 (footnote omitted) ("The jury selection system can easily survive the loss of peremptory challenges.").
134 The Court has repeatedly praised the peremptory as an essential element in
achieving a fair and impartialjury. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22 (noting that historically, the peremptory challenge has been important in selecting an impartial jury);
Swain, 380 U.S. at 212 (declaring that the peremptory challenge helps parties obtain a
fair and impartial jury); Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (hailing the
peremptory challenge as "one of the most important of the rights secured to the
accused").
Some commentators, however, have contended that the peremptory challenge is
merely a tool that litigants use to achieve a "stacked"jury. See Richard Singer, Peremptory Holds: A Suggestion (Only Half Specious) of a Solution to the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges,62 U. DET. L. REv. 275, 288 (1985). Singer contended that "neither
side really wishes an impartial jury, but rather wishes to do everything possible to find
jurors more attuned to its world view." Id. In so doing, it would seem that litigants
are able to secure an unfair and partial jury, contrary to the very purpose of the
challenge.
135 For a discussion urging the Court to abolish the peremptory challenge, see
Bunting & Reardon, supra note 2, at 358. The authors explained that:
the Court has recognized that the (peremptory] challenge must yield to
the constitutional requirements of equal protection. The recent cases
of Edmonson and Powers, combined with a potential expansion to other
cognizable groups will so dilute the effectiveness of the peremptory
challenge, that it should be abolished in order to eradicate discrimination from the courtroom. The right to a fair and impartial jury is best
served by abolishing the challenge outright, rather than allowing discrimination to continue under the uneven protection of Batson and
Edmonson.
Id. at 358; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall,J., concurring) ("The decision
today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury
selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely.").
Alternatively, authors have also argued that the peremptory challenge is an essen-
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To achieve its goal of eradicating discrimination from the
courtroom, the Court must ban the practice that is by definition
based upon often inarticulable prejudices.1 36 Concerns regarding
the procedural impact of the Court's decision upon the entire system further contribute to the case for abolition of the peremptory.
First, the Court's holding inJE.B. will add to the number of Batson
mini-hearings, in which litigants may demand explanations for
strikes appearing to be gender-based. Consequently, the problem
of over-crowded dockets will only increase as trials are stretched
37
out, additional appeals are heard, and new trials are granted.'
Second, and even more troublesome, is the fact that the Court has
provided little guidance to the lower courts regarding implementation of the new rules. 38 Thus, "'[t] he pursuit of judicial perfection will require both trial and appellate courts to provide
tial and irreplaceable component of the jury selection process. See generally Babcock,
supra note 132; Horwitz, supra note 2. Horwitz asserted that "[tihe Supreme Court
has, in essence, already abandoned the peremptory challenge as an outmoded relic of
dissimilar judicial objectives from those of the present day. Yet, the peremptory is as
important today as ever in achieving what it was designed to accomplish." Horwitz,
supra note 2, at 1439 (footnote omitted).
136 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining that an inarticulable suspicion is central to the use of the peremptory challenge).
137 Justice O'Connor stated that "Batson mini-hearings are now routine in state and
federal trial courts, and Batson appeals have proliferated as well. Demographics indicate that today's holding may have an even greater impact than did Batson itself."
JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Additionally, as Justice Scalia
argued in dissent:
damage has been done ... to the entire justice system, which will bear
the burden of the expanded quest for 'reasoned peremptories' that the
Court demands. The extension of Batson to sex, and almost certainly
beyond ... will provide the basis for extensive collateral litigation ....
[E]very case contains a potential sex-based claim.
Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)); see also Alschuler, supranote 2, at 156 (recognizing that Batson "produced cumbersome procedures that will generate burdensome litigation for years to come").
138 Dissenting in Batson, Chief Justice Burger recognized that
The Court does not tarry long over any of these difficult, sensitive
problems, preferring instead to gloss over them as swiftly as it slides over
centuries of history: '[wie make no attempt to instruct [trial] courts
how best to implement our holding today.' . . . That leaves roughly

7,000 general jurisdiction state trial judges and approximately 500 federal trial judges at large to find their way through the morass the Court
creates today.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 130-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Michael
N. Chesney & Gerald T. Gallagher, Note, State Action and the Peremptory Challenge:
Evolution of the Court's Treatment and Implicationsfor Georgia v. McCollum, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1049, 1055 (1992) (criticizing the Batson Court for providing little guidance to litigants trying to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination).

786

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:756

speculative and impractical answers to artificial questions.' 13 9
Third, as litigants are able to mask the real reasons for their strikes
by claiming that the strikes were based upon what remain permissi140
ble stereotypes, the Court's decision may in fact be meaningless.
Thus, the Court's attempt to abolish discrimination will fail, and
the peremptory is likely to collapse under the weight of these
Court-created difficulties.
It seems that clever litigants have already devised and tested
methods of circumventing the Court's holding in JE.B. In New
York v. Allen,14 ' a recent New York Appellate Division case, the
court was forced to consider implementation of the extension of
Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges. 14 2 In Allen, the
prosecution used ninety percent of its peremptory challenges to
strike men for what it claimed were gender-neutral reasons, yet
failed to strike women falling within those reasons. 143 The court
held that the explanations were merely pretextual and served to
mask the State's true intent to discriminate on the basis of gender. 44 Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial to consider the criminal charges against the
defendant.'4 5
Among the many problems with the New York court's implementation of JE.B.'s extension of Batson to gender is that Batson
merely required the party accused of discrimination to present
race-neutral explanations for those strikes.' 4 6 Batson did not require, as the Allen appellate court did, that the prosecutor give gender-neutral reasons for jurors who were not struck who might
possibly be perceived as possessing some of the same undesirable
139 Batson, 476 U.S. at 131 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Holley v. J. & S.
Sweeping Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 74, 79 (Ct. App. 1983) (Holmdahl, J., concurring)).
140 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("If such easily generated
explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his
strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court today may be
illusory."). Additionally, the potential for abuse of the peremptory challenge is not
diminished by the Court's holding, but rather is increased as litigants are given the
opportunity to question each and every strike. As ChiefJustice Burger contended, "it
is quite probable that every peremptory challenge could be objected to on the basis
that, because it excluded a venireman who had some characteristic not shared by the
remaining members of the venire, it constituted a 'classification' subject to equal protection scrutiny." Id. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
141 616 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (App. Div. 1994).

142 See id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 673-74.
145 Id. at 674.
146 Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
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characteristics as any excluded male juror. 147 The appellate court,
in ordering those explanations, shifted the burden of proof onto
the State, contrary to the holding of Batson.14 8 Thus, the JE.B.
Court's failure to provide guidance to the lower courts, while adding to the confusion created by Batson, has already produced serious problems in the implementation of the new rule.
Although the majority claimed that the threat of discrimination is that it "'invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality"'
into the courtroom,1 4 9 the Court failed to recognize that its holding will actually invite skepticism into the entire jury selection process. The potential for cynicism is increased, not diminished, as
attorneys are encouraged to challenge every peremptory strike as
gender-based. Additionally, the Court has raised the right to sit on
ajury-not a constitutional right-over the litigant's right to a fair
and impartial trial, which is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for the future of the peremptory challenge, is the fact that the Court failed to address the
question of just what stereotypes the law condemns.15 ° Will they
change over time? Is it the duty of each trial court to decide which
classifications are permissible? Until the Court faces these questions and evaluates the effectiveness of the peremptory challenge
as a tool to ensure a fair and impartial trial, the system is forced to
proceed according to a logic that is destined to collapse under the
weight of its own deficiencies.
Stacy A. Dowling

Allen, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (Casey, J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97).
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (resting the burden of coming forward with a prima
facie case of discriminatory intent on the party alleging discrimination).
149 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427 (1994) (quoting Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991)).
150 See id. at 1426 (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 410).
147
148

